

# The Artios Home Companion Series

## Unit 9: America - A World Power

### Teacher Overview

Between the fateful moment in March 1775 when Edmund Burke unfolded to his colleagues in the British Parliament the resources of an invincible America, and the settlement at Versailles in 1919 closing the drama of World War I, this nation became a world power, influencing by its example, by its institutions, by its wealth, trade, and arms the course of international affairs. And it should be said also that neither in the field of commercial enterprise nor in that of diplomacy has it been lacking in spirit or ingenuity.



The U.S. Flag: July 4, 1896 – July 3, 1908

### Key People, Places, and Events

Treaty of Washington  
Napoleon III  
The Purchase of Alaska  
William McKinley  
Grover Cleveland  
The Annexation of Hawaii  
Ostend Manifesto  
President Ulysses S. Grant

### Reading and Assignments

In this unit, students will:

- Complete two lessons in which they will learn about **America as a world power**, **Cuba**, and **the Spanish War**, journaling and answering discussion questions as they read.
- Define vocabulary words.
- Be sure to visit [www.ArtiosHCS.com](http://www.ArtiosHCS.com) for additional resources.

### Vocabulary

#### Lesson 1:

coerce  
curt  
illusory  
omen  
insolent  
intrigue  
fruition  
remonstrate  
arbitrament

protectorate  
appropriation  
portent  
propriety  
cavalier

#### Lesson 2:

inimical  
insurgent  
guerilla  
warfare  
atrocity  
filch  
malevolence

### Leading Ideas

**Honesty is a character quality to be desired.** \

*The Lord detests differing weights, and dishonest scales do not please Him.*

— Proverbs 20:23

## The Bible provides the ethics upon which to judge people and nations.

— Exodus 20:1-17

## God is sovereign over the affairs of men.

*From one man He made all the nations, that they should inhabit the whole earth; and He marked out their appointed times in history and the boundaries of their lands.*

— Acts 17:26

## Scripture addresses the Christian's responsibility to government.

*Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God. Therefore whoever resists the authorities resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will incur judgment. For rulers are not a terror to good conduct, but to bad. Would you have no fear of the one who is in authority? Then do what is good, and you will receive his approval, for he is God's servant for your good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword in vain. For he is the servant of God, an avenger who carries out God's wrath on the wrongdoer. Therefore one must be in subjection, not only to avoid God's wrath but also for the sake of conscience. For because of this you also pay taxes, for the authorities are ministers of God, attending to this very thing. Pay to all what is owed to them: taxes to whom taxes are owed, revenue to whom revenue is owed, respect to whom respect is owed, honor to whom honor is owed.*

— Romans 13:1-7

## Lesson One

### History Overview and Assignments America, a World Power

After the war for the Union, the Department of State had many an occasion to present the rights of America among the powers of the world. This was seen in their dealings with France, Mexico, Samoa, the purchase of Alaska, American interests in the Caribbean, the Venezuela Affair and more.

## Reading and Assignments

- Review the discussion questions and vocabulary, then read the article: *America, a World Power*.
- Narrate about today's reading using the appropriate notebook page. Be sure to answer the discussion questions and include key people, events, and dates within the narration.
- Define the vocabulary words in the context of the reading and put the word and its definition in the vocabulary section of your history notebook.
- Be sure to visit [www.ArtiosHCS.com](http://www.ArtiosHCS.com) for additional resources.



1900 Campaign poster: McKinley ran on his record.

## Vocabulary

coerce  
 curt  
 illusory  
 omen  
 insolent  
 intrigue  
 fruition  
 remonstrate  
 protectorate  
 appropriation  
 portent  
 propriety  
 cavalier  
 arbitrament

## Key People, Places, and Events

Treaty of Washington  
 Napoleon III  
 The Purchase of Alaska

William McKinley  
 Grover Cleveland  
 The Annexation of Hawaii

## Discussion Questions

1. What is meant by the term “world power” when used in this article?
2. What was The Treaty of Washington?
3. Describe American foreign relations in Samoa.
4. Describe the conflict between America, France, and Mexico which involved Napoleon III.
5. From whom did America purchase Alaska? How did this increase the size of the country?
6. Describe American foreign relations in the Caribbean.
7. How was the *Alabama* Claim arbitrated?
8. Describe American foreign relations in the Venezuela Affair.
9. What was the result of the investigation into the Venezuela Affair?
10. How did the islands of Hawaii come to be annexed to the United States?

Adapted for High School from the book:

## *History of the United States*

by Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard

### *America, a World Power*

It became a fashion, sanctioned by wide usage and by eminent historians, to speak of America as entering the twentieth century in the role of “a world power,” for the first time. Perhaps at this late day, it is useless to protest against the idea. Nevertheless, the truth is that between the fateful moment in March, 1775 when Edmund Burke unfolded to his colleagues in the British Parliament the resources of an invincible America, and the settlement at Versailles in 1919 closing the drama of World War I, this nation became a world power, influencing by its example, by its institutions, by its wealth, trade, and arms the course of international affairs. And it should be said also that neither in the field of commercial enterprise nor in that of diplomacy has it been lacking in spirit or ingenuity.

When John Hay, secretary of state, heard that an American citizen, Perdicaris, had been seized by Raisuli, a Moroccan bandit, in 1904, he wired his brusque message: “We want Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead.” This was but an echo of Commodore Decatur’s equally characteristic answer, “Not a minute,” given nearly a hundred years before to the pirates of Algiers begging for time to consider whether they would cease preying upon American merchantmen. Was it not as early as 1844 that the American commissioner, Caleb Cushing, taking advantage of the British Opium War on China, negotiated with the Celestial Empire a successful commercial treaty? Did he not then exultantly exclaim: “The laws of the Union

follow its citizens and its banner protects them even within the domain of the Chinese Empire”? Was it not almost half a century before the battle of Manila Bay in 1898, that Commodore Perry with an adequate naval force “gently coerced Japan into friendship with us,” leading all the nations of the earth in the opening of that empire to the trade of the Occident? Nor is it inappropriate in this connection to recall the fact that the Monroe Doctrine celebrated in 1923 its hundredth anniversary.

#### AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

(1865-1898)

##### **French Intrigues in Mexico Blocked**

After the war for the Union, the Department of State had many an occasion to present the rights of America among the powers of the world. Only a little while after the civil conflict came to a close, it was called upon to deal with a dangerous situation created in Mexico by the ambitions of Napoleon III. During the administration of Buchanan, Mexico had fallen into disorder through the strife of the Liberal and the Clerical parties; the president asked for authority to use American troops to bring to a peaceful haven “*a wreck upon the ocean, drifting about as she is impelled by different factions.*” Our own domestic crisis then intervened.

Observing the United States heavily involved in its own problems, the great powers—England, France, and Spain—

decided in the autumn of 1861 to take a hand themselves in restoring order in Mexico. They entered into an agreement to enforce the claims of their citizens against Mexico and to protect their subjects residing in that republic. They invited the United States to join them, and, on meeting a polite refusal, they prepared for a combined military and naval demonstration on their own account. In the midst of this action England and Spain, discovering the sinister purposes of Napoleon, withdrew their troops and left the field to him.

The French emperor, it was well known, looked with jealousy upon the growth of the United States and dreamed of establishing in the western hemisphere an imperial power to offset the American Republic. Intervention to collect debts was only a cloak for his deeper designs. Throwing off that guise in due time, he made the Archduke Maximilian, a brother of the ruler of Austria, emperor in Mexico, and surrounded his throne by French soldiers, in spite of all protests.

This insolent attack upon the Mexican Republic, deeply resented in the United States, was allowed to drift in its course until 1865. At that juncture General Sheridan was dispatched to the Mexican border with a large armed force; General Grant urged the use of the American army to expel the French from this continent. The secretary of state, Seward, counseled negotiation first, and, applying the Monroe Doctrine, was able to prevail upon Napoleon III to withdraw his troops. Without the support of French arms, the sham empire in Mexico collapsed like a house of cards and the unhappy Maximilian, the victim of French ambition

and intrigue, met his death at the hands of a Mexican firing squad.

### **Alaska Purchased**

The Mexican affair had not been brought to a close before the Department of State was busy with negotiations which resulted in the purchase of Alaska from Russia. The treaty of cession, signed on March 30, 1867, added to the United States a domain of nearly six hundred thousand square miles, a territory larger than Texas and nearly three-fourths the size of the Louisiana Purchase. Though it was a distant colony separated from our continental domain by a thousand miles of water, no question of “imperialism” or “colonization foreign to American doctrines” seems to have been raised at the time. The treaty was ratified promptly by the Senate. The purchase price, \$7,200,000, was voted by the House of Representatives after the display of some resentment against a system that compelled it to appropriate money to fulfill an obligation which it had no part in making. Seward, who formulated the treaty, rejoiced, as he afterwards said, that he had kept Alaska out of the hands of England.



Alaska's size compared with the 48 contiguous states.

**American Interest in the Caribbean**  
Having achieved this diplomatic

triumph, Seward turned to the increase of American power in another direction. He negotiated with Denmark a treaty providing for the purchase of the islands of St. John and St. Thomas in the West Indies, strategic points in the Caribbean for sea power. This project, long afterward brought to fruition by other men, was defeated on this occasion by the refusal of the Senate to ratify the treaty. Evidently it was not yet prepared to exercise colonial dominion over other races.

Undaunted by the misadventure in Caribbean policies, President Grant warmly advocated the acquisition of Santo Domingo. This little republic had long been in a state of general disorder. In 1869 a treaty of annexation was concluded with its president. The document Grant transmitted to the Senate with his cordial approval, only to have it rejected. Not at all changed in his opinion by the outcome of his effort, he continued to urge the subject of annexation. Even in his last message to Congress he referred to it, saying that time had only proved the wisdom of his early course. The addition of Santo Domingo to the American sphere of protection was the work of a later generation. The State Department, temporarily checked, had to bide its time.

### **The *Alabama* Claims Arbitrated**

Indeed, it had in hand a far more serious matter, a vexing issue that grew out of Civil War diplomacy. The British government, as already pointed out in other connections, had permitted Confederate cruisers, including the famous *Alabama*, built in British ports, to escape and prey upon the commerce of the northern states. This action, denounced at the time by our government as a grave breach of neutrality as well as a grievous injury to American

citizens, led first to remonstrances and finally to repeated claims for damages done to American ships and goods. For a long time Great Britain was firm. Her foreign secretary denied all obligations in the premises, adding somewhat curtly that “he wished to say once for all that Her Majesty’s government disclaimed any responsibility for the losses and hoped that they had made their position perfectly clear.” Still President Grant was not persuaded that the door of diplomacy, though closed, was barred. Hamilton Fish, his secretary of state, renewed the demand. Finally he secured from the British government in 1871 the Treaty of Washington providing for the arbitration not merely of the *Alabama* and other claims but also all points of serious controversy between the two countries.

The tribunal of arbitration thus authorized sat at Geneva in Switzerland, and after a long and careful review of the arguments on both sides awarded to the United States the lump sum of \$15,500,000 to be distributed among the American claimants. The damages thus allowed were large, unquestionably larger than strict justice required and it is not surprising that the decision excited much adverse comment in England. Nevertheless, the prompt payment by the British government swept away at once a great cloud of ill-feeling in America. Moreover, the spectacle of two powerful nations choosing the way of peaceful arbitration to settle an angry dispute seemed a happy, if illusory, omen of a modern method for avoiding the arbitrament of war.

### **Samoa**

If the Senate had its doubts at first about

the wisdom of acquiring strategic points for naval power in distant seas, the same could not be said of the State Department or naval officers. In 1872 Commander Meade of the United States navy, alive to the importance of coaling stations even in mid-ocean, made a commercial agreement with the chief of Tutuila, one of the Samoan Islands, far below the equator in the southern Pacific and nearer to Australia than to California. This agreement, providing among other things for our use of the harbor of Pago Pago as a naval base, was six years later changed into a formal treaty ratified by the Senate.



Location of Samoa

Such an enterprise could not escape the vigilant eyes of England and Germany, both mindful of the course of sea power in history. The German emperor, seizing as a pretext a quarrel between his consul in the islands and a native king, laid claim to an interest in the Samoan group. England, aware of the dangers arising from German outposts in the southern seas so near to Australia, was not content to stand aside. So it happened that all three countries sent battleships to the Samoan waters, threatening a crisis that was fortunately averted by friendly settlement. If, as is alleged, Germany entertained a notion of

challenging American sea power then and there, the presence of British ships must have dispelled that dream.

The result of the affair was a tripartite agreement by which the three powers in 1889 undertook a protectorate over the islands. But joint control proved unsatisfactory. There was constant friction between the Germans and the English. The spheres of authority being vague and open to dispute, the plan had to be abandoned at the end of ten years. England withdrew altogether, leaving to Germany all the islands except Tutuila, which was ceded outright to the United States. Thus one of the finest harbors in the Pacific, to the intense delight of the American navy, passed permanently under American dominion. Another triumph in diplomacy was set down to the credit of the State Department.

### **Cleveland and the Venezuela Affair**

In relations with South America, as well as in those with the distant Pacific, the diplomacy of the government at Washington was put to the test. For some time it had been watching a dispute between England and Venezuela over the western boundary of British Guiana and, on an appeal from Venezuela, it had taken a lively interest in the contest. In 1895 President Cleveland saw that Great Britain would yield none of her claims. After hearing the arguments of Venezuela, his secretary of state, Richard T. Olney, in a note none too conciliatory, asked the British government whether it was willing to submit the points in controversy to arbitration. This inquiry he accompanied by a warning to the effect that the United States could not permit any European power to contest its mastery in

this hemisphere. “The United States,” said the secretary, “is practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition...Its infinite resources, combined with its isolated position, render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable against any or all other powers.”

The reply evoked from the British government by this strong statement was firm and clear. The Monroe Doctrine, it said, even if not so widely stretched by interpretation, was not binding in international law; the dispute with Venezuela was a matter of interest merely to the parties involved; and arbitration of the question was impossible. This response called forth President Cleveland’s startling message of 1895. He asked Congress to create a commission authorized to ascertain by research the true boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana. He added that it would be the duty of this country “to resist by every means in its power, as a willful aggression upon its rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which, after investigation, we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela.” The serious character of this statement he thoroughly understood. He declared that he was conscious of his responsibilities, intimating that war, much as it was to be deplored, was not comparable to “a supine submission to wrong and injustice and the consequent loss of national self-respect and honor.”

The note of defiance which ran through this message, greeted by shrill cries of enthusiasm in many circles, was viewed in other quarters as a portent of war.

Responsible newspapers in both countries spoke of an armed settlement of the dispute as inevitable. Congress created the commission and appropriated money for the investigation; a body of learned men was appointed to determine the merits of the conflicting boundary claims. The British government, deaf to the clamor of the bellicose section of the London press, deplored the incident, courteously replied in the affirmative to a request for assistance in the search for evidence, and finally agreed to the proposition that the issue be submitted to arbitration. The outcome of this somewhat perilous dispute contributed not a little to Cleveland’s reputation as “a sterling representative of the true American spirit.” This was not diminished when the tribunal of arbitration found that Great Britain was on the whole right in her territorial claims against Venezuela.



On August 12, 1898, the flag of the Republic of Hawaii over 'Iolani Palace was lowered to raise the United States flag to signify annexation.

### **The Annexation of Hawaii**

While engaged in the dangerous Venezuela controversy, President Cleveland was compelled by a strange turn of events to consider the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands in the mid-Pacific. For more than half a century, American missionaries had been active in converting the natives to the



Christian faith and enterprising American businessmen had been developing the fertile sugar plantations. Both the Department of State and the Navy Department were fully conscious of the strategic relation of the islands to the growth of sea power and watched with anxiety any developments likely to bring them under some other dominion.

The country at large was indifferent, however, until 1893, when a revolution, headed by Americans, broke out, ending in the overthrow of the native government, the abolition of the primitive monarchy, and the retirement of Queen Liliuokalani to private life. This crisis, a repetition of the Texas affair in a small theater, was immediately followed by a demand from the new Hawaiian government for annexation to the United States. President Harrison looked with favor on the proposal, negotiated the treaty of annexation, and laid it before the Senate for approval. There it still rested when his term of office was brought to a close.

Harrison's successor, Cleveland, it was well known, had doubts about the propriety of American action in Hawaii. For the purpose of making an inquiry into the matter, he sent a special commissioner to the islands. On the basis of the report of his agent, Cleveland came to the conclusion

that "the revolution in the island kingdom had been accomplished by the improper use of the armed forces of the United States and that the wrong should be righted by a restoration of the queen to her throne." Such being his matured conviction, though the facts upon which he rested it were disputed, he could do nothing but withdraw the treaty from the Senate and close the incident.

To the Republicans this sharp and cavalier disposal of their plans, carried out in a way that impugned the motives of a Republican president, was nothing less than "a betrayal of American interests." In their platform of 1896 they made clear their position: "Our foreign policy should be at all times firm, vigorous, and dignified and all our interests in the western hemisphere carefully watched and guarded. The Hawaiian Islands should be controlled by the United States and no foreign power should be permitted to interfere with them." There was no mistaking this view of the issue. As the vote in the election gave popular sanction to Republican policies, Congress by a joint resolution, passed on July 6, 1898, annexed the islands to the United States and later conferred upon them the ordinary territorial form of government.

## Lesson Two

### History Overview and Assignments Cuba and the Spanish-American War

The year that brought Hawaii finally under the American flag likewise drew to a conclusion another long controversy over a similar outpost in the Atlantic, one of the last remnants of the once glorious Spanish empire—the island of Cuba.



*Charge of the Rough Riders at San Juan Hill*  
by Frederic Remington

## Vocabulary

inimical	insurgent
guerilla warfare	atrocities
filch	malevolence

## Key People, Places, and Events

Ostend Manifesto  
President Ulysses S. Grant

## Reading and Assignments

- Review the discussion questions and vocabulary, then read the article: *Cuba and the Spanish War*.
- Narrate about today's reading using the appropriate notebook page. Be sure to answer the discussion questions and include key people, events, and dates within the narration.
- Define the vocabulary words in the context of the reading and put the word and its definition in the vocabulary section of your history notebook.
- Visit [www.ArtiosHCS.com](http://www.ArtiosHCS.com) for additional resources.

## Discussion Questions

1. What was President Cleveland's policy on the war between Cuba and Spain?
2. How did President McKinley approach the same conflict?
3. How was the United States drawn into the Cuban conflict?
4. Why do you think President McKinley ignored the final program of concessions presented by Spain regarding the war with Cuba?
5. What were the parameters and details regarding the resolution made by Congress regarding the war between Cuba and Spain?
6. What were the final terms of peace?
7. Describe England's attitude toward the war and its outcome.
8. In your opinion, was the U.S. justified in initiating the Spanish-American War? Why or why not?

*Adapted for High School from the book:*

### *History of the United States*

*by Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard*

### *Cuba and the Spanish War*

#### **Early American Relations with Cuba**

The year that brought Hawaii finally

under the American flag likewise drew to a conclusion another long controversy over a

similar outpost in the Atlantic, one of the last remnants of the once glorious Spanish empire—the island of Cuba.



An old cartoon on Cuba

For a century the Department of State had kept an anxious eye upon this base of power, knowing full well that both France and England, already well-established in the West Indies, had their attention also fixed upon Cuba. During the administration of President Fillmore they had united in proposing to the United States a tripartite treaty guaranteeing Spain in her none too certain ownership. This proposal, squarely rejected, furnished the occasion for a statement of American policy which stood the test of all the years that followed; namely, that the affair was one between Spain and the United States alone.

In that long contest in the United States for the balance of power between the North and South, leaders in the latter section often thought of bringing Cuba into the Union to offset the Free states. An opportunity to announce their purposes publicly was

afforded in 1854 by a controversy over the seizure of an American ship by Cuban authorities. On that occasion three American ministers abroad, stationed at Madrid, Paris, and London, held a conference and issued the celebrated "Ostend Manifesto." They united in declaring that Cuba, by her geographical position, formed a part of the United States, that possession by a foreign power was inimical to American interests, and that an effort should be made to purchase the island from Spain. In case the owner refused to sell, they concluded with a menacing flourish, "*by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain if we possess the power.*" This startling proclamation to the world was promptly disowned by the United States government.

### Revolutions in Cuba

For nearly twenty years afterwards the Cuban question rested. Then it was revived in another form during President Grant's administrations, when the natives became engaged in a destructive revolt against Spanish officials. For ten years—1868-78—guerrilla warfare raged on the island. American citizens, by virtue of their ancient traditions of democracy, naturally sympathized with a war for independence and self-government. Expeditions to help the insurgents were fitted out secretly in American ports. Arms and supplies were smuggled into Cuba. American soldiers of fortune joined their ranks. The enforcement of neutrality against the friends of Cuban independence (no pleasing task for a sympathetic president), the protection of American lives and property in the revolutionary area, and similar matters kept

our government busy with Cuba for a whole decade.

A brief lull in Cuban disorders was followed in 1895 by a renewal of the revolutionary movement. The contest between the rebels and the Spanish troops, marked by extreme cruelty and a total disregard for life and property, exceeded all bounds of decency and once more raised the old questions that had tormented Grant's administration. Gomez, the leader of the revolt, intent upon provoking American interference, laid waste the land with fire and sword. By a proclamation of November 6, 1895, he ordered the destruction of sugar plantations and railway connections and the closure of all sugar factories. The work of ruin was completed by the ruthless Spanish general Weyler, who concentrated the inhabitants from rural regions into military camps, where they died by the hundreds of disease and starvation. Stories of the atrocities, bad enough in simple form, became lurid when transmuted into American news and deeply moved the sympathies of the American people. Sermons were preached about Spanish misdeeds; orators demanded that the Cubans be sustained "in their heroic struggle for independence"; newspapers, skirting the ordinary forms of diplomatic negotiation, spurned mediation and demanded intervention and war if necessary.

### **President Cleveland's Policy**

Cleveland chose the way of peace. He ordered the observance of the rule of neutrality. He declined to act on a resolution of Congress in favor of giving to the Cubans the rights of belligerents. Anxious to bring order to the distracted

island, he tendered to Spain the good offices of the United States as mediator in the contest—a tender rejected by the Spanish government with the broad hint that President Cleveland might be more vigorous in putting a stop to the unlawful aid in money, arms, and supplies afforded to the insurgents by American sympathizers. Thereupon the president returned to the course he had marked out for himself, leaving "the public nuisance" to his successor, President McKinley.

### **Republican Policies**

The Republicans in 1897 found themselves in a position to employ that "firm, vigorous, and dignified" foreign policy which they had approved in their platform. They had declared: "The government of Spain having lost control of Cuba and being unable to protect the property or lives of resident American citizens or to comply with its treaty obligations, we believe that the government of the United States should actively use its influence and good offices to restore peace and give independence to the island." The American property in Cuba to which the Republicans referred in their platform amounted by this time to more than fifty million dollars; the commerce with the island reached more than one hundred millions annually; and the claims of American citizens against Spain for property destroyed totaled sixteen millions. To the pleas of humanity which made such an effective appeal to the hearts of the American people, there were thus added practical considerations of great weight.

### **President McKinley Negotiates**

In the face of the swelling tide of popular

opinion in favor of quick, drastic, and positive action, McKinley chose first the way of diplomacy. A short time after his inauguration he lodged with the Spanish government a dignified protest against its policies in Cuba, thus opening a game of thrust and parry with the suave ministers at Madrid. The results of the exchange of notes were the recall of the obnoxious General Weyler, the appointment of a governor-general less bloodthirsty in his methods, a change in the policy of concentrating civilians in military camps, and finally a promise of “home rule” for Cuba. There is no doubt that the Spanish government was eager to avoid a war that could have but one outcome. The American minister at Madrid, General Woodford, was convinced that firm and patient pressure would have resulted in the final surrender of Cuba by the Spanish government.

### **The de Lôme and the Maine Incidents**

Such a policy was defeated by events. In February, 1898, a private letter written by Señor Enrique Dupuy de Lôme, the Spanish ambassador at Washington, expressing contempt for the president of the United States, was filched from the mails and passed into the hands of a journalist, William R. Hearst, who published it to the world. In the excited state of American opinion, few gave heed to the grave breach of diplomatic courtesy committed by breaking open private correspondence. The Spanish government was compelled to recall de Lôme, thus officially condemning his conduct.

At this point a far more serious crisis put the peaceful relations of the two negotiating countries in dire peril. On February 15, the

battleship *Maine*, riding in the harbor of Havana, was blown up and sunk, carrying to death two officers and two hundred and fifty-eight members of the crew. This tragedy, ascribed by the American public to the malevolence of Spanish officials, profoundly stirred an already furious nation. When, on March 21, a commission of inquiry reported that the ill-fated ship had been blown up by a submarine mine which had in turn set off some of the ship’s magazines, the worst suspicions seemed confirmed. If anyone was inclined to be indifferent to the Cuban war for independence, he was now met by the vehement cry: “Remember the *Maine*!”

### **Spanish Concessions**

Still the State Department, under McKinley’s steady hand, pursued the path of negotiation, Spain proving more pliable and more ready with promises of reform in the island. Early in April, however, there came a decided change in the tenor of American diplomacy. On the 4<sup>th</sup>, McKinley, evidently convinced that promises did not mean performances, instructed our minister at Madrid to warn the Spanish government that as no effective armistice had been offered to the Cubans, he would lay the whole matter before Congress. This decision, everyone knew from the temper of Congress, meant war—a prospect which excited all the European powers. The pope took an active interest in the crisis. France and Germany, foreseeing from long experience in world politics an increase of American power and prestige through war, sought to prevent it. Spain, hopeless and conscious of her weakness, at last dispatched to the president a note promising to suspend hostilities, to call a

Cuban parliament, and to grant all the autonomy that could be reasonably asked.

### **President McKinley Calls for War**

For reasons of his own—reasons which have never yet been fully explained—McKinley ignored the final program of concessions presented by Spain. At the very moment when his patient negotiations seemed to bear full fruit, he veered sharply from his course and launched the country into the war by sending to Congress his militant message of April 11, 1898. Without making public the last note he had received from Spain, he declared that he was brought to the end of his effort and the cause was in the hands of Congress. Humanity, the protection of American citizens and property, the injuries to American commerce and business, the inability of Spain to bring about permanent peace in the island—these were the grounds for action that induced him to ask for authority to employ military and naval forces in establishing a stable government in Cuba. They were sufficient for a public already straining at the leash.

### **The Resolution of Congress**

There was no doubt of the outcome when the issue was withdrawn from diplomacy and placed in charge of Congress. Resolutions were soon introduced into the House of Representatives authorizing the president to employ armed force in securing peace and order in the island and “establishing by the free action of the people thereof a stable and independent government of their own.” To the form and spirit of this proposal the Democrats and Populists took exception. In the Senate, where they were stronger, their

position had to be reckoned with by the narrow Republican majority. As the resolution finally read, the independence of Cuba was recognized; Spain was called upon to relinquish her authority and withdraw from the island; and the president was empowered to use force to the extent necessary to carry the resolutions into effect. Furthermore the United States disclaimed “any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof.” Final action was taken by Congress on April 19, 1898, and approved by the president on the following day.

### **War and Victory**

Startling events then followed in swift succession. The Navy, as a result in no small measure of the alertness of Theodore Roosevelt, assistant secretary of the Department, was ready for the trial by battle. On May 1, Commodore Dewey at Manila Bay shattered the Spanish fleet, marking the doom of Spanish dominion in the Philippines. On July 3, the Spanish fleet under Admiral Cervera, in attempting to escape from Havana, was utterly destroyed by American forces under Commodore Schley. On July 17, Santiago, invested by American troops under General Shafter and shelled by the American ships, gave up the struggle. On July 25 General Miles landed in Puerto Rico. On August 13, General Merritt and Admiral Dewey carried Manila by storm. The war was over.

### **The Peace Protocol**

Spain had already taken cognizance of stern facts. As early as July 26, 1898, acting through the French ambassador, Jules-Martin Cambon, the Madrid government

approached President McKinley for a statement of the terms on which hostilities could be brought to a close. After some skirmishing Spain yielded reluctantly to the ultimatum. On August 12, the preliminary peace protocol was signed, stipulating that Cuba should be free, Puerto Rico ceded to the United States, and Manila occupied by American troops pending the formal treaty of peace. On October 1, the commissioners of the two countries met at Paris to bring about the final settlement.

### **Peace Negotiations**

When the day for the first session of the conference arrived, the government at Washington apparently had not made up its mind on the final disposition of the Philippines. Perhaps, before the battle of Manila Bay, not ten thousand people in the United States knew or cared where the Philippines were. Certainly there was in the autumn of 1898 no decided opinion as to what should be done with the fruits of Dewey's victory. President McKinley doubtless voiced the sentiment of the people when he stated to the peace commissioners on the eve of their departure that there had originally been no thought of conquest in the Pacific.

The march of events, he added, had imposed new duties on the country. "Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines," he said, "is the commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship cannot be indifferent. It is just to use every legitimate means for the enlargement of American trade." On this ground he directed the commissioners to accept not less than the cession of the island of Luzon, the chief of the Philippine group, with its harbor of Manila. It was not until

the latter part of October that he definitely instructed them to demand the entire archipelago, on the theory that the occupation of Luzon alone could not be justified "on political, commercial, or humanitarian grounds." This departure from the letter of the peace protocol was bitterly resented by the Spanish agents. It was with heaviness of heart that they surrendered the last sign of Spain's ancient dominion in the far Pacific.

### **The Final Terms of Peace**

The treaty of peace, as finally agreed upon, embraced the following terms: the independence of Cuba; the cession of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines to the United States; the settlement of claims filed by the citizens of both countries; the payment of twenty million dollars to Spain by the United States for the Philippines; and the determination of the status of the inhabitants of the ceded territories by Congress. The great decision had been made. Its issue was in the hands of the Senate where the Democrats and the Populists held the balance of power under the requirement of the two-thirds vote for ratification.

### **The Contest in America Over the Treaty of Peace**

The publication of the treaty committing the United States to the administration of distant colonies directed the shifting tides of public opinion into two distinct channels: support for the policy and opposition to it. The trend in Republican leadership, long in the direction marked out by the treaty, now came into the open. Perhaps a majority of the men highest in the councils of that party had undergone the change of heart reflected

in the letters of John Hay, secretary of state. In August of 1898 he had hinted, in a friendly letter to Andrew Carnegie, that he sympathized with the latter's opposition to "imperialism"; but he had added quickly: "The only question in my mind is how far it is now possible for us to withdraw from the Philippines." In November of the same year he wrote to Whitelaw Reid, one of the peace commissioners at Paris: "There is a wild and frantic attack now going on in the press against the whole Philippine transaction. Andrew Carnegie really seems to be off his head...But all this confusion of tongues will go its way. The country will applaud the resolution that has been reached, and you will return in the role of conquering heroes with your 'brows bound with oak.'"

Senator Beveridge of Indiana and Senator Platt of Connecticut, accepting the verdict of history as the proof of manifest destiny, called for unquestioning support of the administration in its final step. "Every expansion of our territory," said the latter, "has been in accordance with the irresistible law of growth. We could no more resist the successive expansions by which we have grown to be the strongest nation on earth than a tree can resist its growth. The history of territorial expansion is the history of our nation's progress and glory. It is a matter to be proud of, not to lament. We should rejoice that Providence has given us the opportunity to extend our influence, our institutions, and our civilization into regions hitherto closed to us, rather than contrive how we can thwart its designs."

This doctrine was savagely attacked by opponents of McKinley's policy, many a staunch Republican joining with the majority of Democrats in denouncing the treaty as a departure from the ideals of the Republic.

Senator Vest introduced in the Senate a resolution that "under the Constitution of the United States, no power is given to the federal government to acquire territory to be held and governed permanently as colonies." Senator Hoar, of Massachusetts, whose long and honorable career gave weight to his lightest words, inveighed against the whole procedure and to the end of his days believed that the new drift into rivalry with European nations as a colonial power was fraught with genuine danger. "Our imperialistic friends," he said, "seem to have forgotten the use of the vocabulary of liberty. They talk about giving good government. 'We shall give them such a government as we think they are fitted for.' 'We shall give them a better government than they had before.' Why, Mr. President, that one phrase conveys to a free man and a free people the most stinging of insults. In that little phrase, as in a seed, is contained the germ of all despotism and of all tyranny. Government is not a gift. Free government is not to be given by all the blended powers of earth and heaven. It is a birthright. It belongs, as our fathers said, and as their children said, as Jefferson said, and as President McKinley said, to human nature itself."

The Senate, more conservative on the question of annexation than the House of Representatives (composed of men freshly elected in the stirring campaign of 1896), was deliberate about ratification of the treaty. The Democrats and Populists were especially recalcitrant. Mr. Bryan hurried to Washington and brought his personal influence to bear in favor of speedy action. Patriotism required ratification, it was said in one quarter. The country desires peace and the Senate ought not to delay, it was



urged in another. Finally, on February 6, 1899, the requisite majority of two-thirds was mustered, many a Senator who voted for the treaty, however, sharing the misgivings of Senator Hoar as to the “dangers of imperialism.” Indeed at the time, the Senators passed a resolution declaring that the policy to be adopted in the Philippines was still an open question, leaving to the future, in this way, the possibility of retracing their steps.

### **The Attitude of England**

The Spanish war, while accomplishing the simple objects of those who launched the nation on that course, like all other wars, produced results wholly unforeseen. In the first place, it exercised a profound influence on the drift of opinion among European powers. In England, sympathy with the United States was from the first positive and outspoken. “The state of feeling here,” wrote Mr. Hay, then ambassador in London, “*is the best I have ever known. From every quarter the evidences of it come to me. The royal family by habit and tradition are most careful not to break the rules of strict neutrality, but even among them I find nothing but hearty kindness and—so far as is consistent with propriety—sympathy. Among the political leaders on both sides I find not only sympathy but a somewhat eager desire that ‘the other fellows’ shall not seem more friendly.*”

Joseph Chamberlain, the distinguished liberal statesman, thinking no doubt of the continental situation, said in a political address at the very opening of the war that the next duty of Englishmen “is to establish and maintain bonds of permanent unity with our kinsmen across the Atlantic....I even go so far as to say that, terrible as war may be, even war would be cheaply purchased if, in a great and noble cause, the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack should wave together over an Anglo-Saxon alliance.” To the American ambassador he added significantly that he did not “care a hang what they say about it on the continent,” which was another way of expressing the hope that the warning to Germany and France was sufficient. This friendly English opinion, so useful to the United States when a combination of powers to support Spain was more than possible, removed all fears as to the consequences of the war. Henry Adams, recalling days of humiliation in London during the Civil War, when his father was the American ambassador, coolly remarked that it was “the sudden appearance of Germany as the grizzly terror” that “frightened England into America’s arms”; but the net result in keeping the field free for an easy triumph of American arms was nonetheless appreciated in Washington where, despite outward calm, fears of European complications were never absent.